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• Governance – application to the Commission
• Procedure and regulatory credibility
• Regulatory conferences
• Judicial review
• Summary of problems and solutions
• Overview: Current processes provide limited
credibility for the Commission because they
do not facilitate a rigorous review of position
papers and draft determinations.  This is
particularly important in the absence of
appeals on merit.  Fortunately a range of
solutions are available.
Governance
• Governance = the design of institutions that
induce or force management to internalize
the welfare of stakeholders (Tirole 2001)
• Regulatory agencies have complex
stakeholder relationships – multiple
stakeholders and conflicting interests.
• Stakeholders include legislators, interest
groups (including “the public”) and the courts
(where appeal rights exist).
Governance and Procedural Rules
• Procedural requirements provide for ample
participation of interest groups.
• Regulatory agencies must:
– provide notice
– inform about proposed rule makings
– make decisions taking into account the
submissions of interested parties
– not make decisions in the absence of supporting
information.
Procedural Rules and Credibility
• Procedural requirements reflect the pursuit of
credibility.
• Credibility is critical if regulation is to be
welfare enhancing:
– In the absence of credible regulation, private
investors require higher rates of return, and will
favour investment in generic rather than specific
assets.
Requirements for regulatory
credibility
• Credibility is enhanced where
– Process provides for scrutiny of the views of all
interested parties, including a rigorous analysis of
the views of the Commission staff,
– The decision-makers are independent of the
parties, and
– The decision-makers are not easily influenced by
the legislators
Requirements for regulatory
credibility #2
• Credibility is also enhanced by strong
incentives for regulators to make quality
decisions
– Loss of professional integrity with poor decisions
(people with substantial reputational capital make
the best regulators)
– Impairment of future career prospects with poor
decisions, and
– Right of appeal on “merit” as well as on “law”
Role of the Commissioners
• Are the Commissioners
– Assessing a report that they have written (with
assistance from staff)? or
– Assessing a report written by the Commission
staff against other available evidence?
• There is little credibility in the claim that the
Commissioners can assess their own report.
• Whether Commissioners can assess a report
of their staff depends on standard
governance problems: principal agent
relationships and management capture.
Regulatory Conferences
• Conferences are designed to provide a forum
for stakeholders to participate and to
increase the credibility of regulation
• Regulated firms, entrants and interest groups
play two important roles:
– Provide regulator with information about the state
of the world
– Provide regulator with information about interest
groups’ preferences
CC Conferences: The theory
• Conferences are not adversarial – no cross
examination
• Representatives of interested parties may be
heard at the conference
• The conference discusses the draft
determination or issues paper of the Commission
• Commissioners use the information from the
conference to inform their decision.
CC Conferences: The reality
• Conferences are adversarial, but rights to cross-
examine are asymmetric.
• The conference discusses the submissions of
the parties but provides no direct examination of
the Draft Determination.
• The extent of the involvement of the
Commissioners in writing the Draft
Determination, and therefore their credibility as
independent assessors of the Draft, is unclear.
Examination of the Draft
Determination
• The Commissioners do not ask the staff
questions about their report.
• The parties are not allowed to ask questions
of the staff or Commissioners
• The conference therefore cannot provide a
rigorous mechanism for reviewing the Draft
Determination.
– This would require the authors of the DD to
answer questions from Commissioners and the
parties.
Absence of Cross-Examination
• Designed to reduce the time and expense
associated with conferences?
• In the absence of cross-examination is it
possible for the conference to
– Elicit all relevant information needed to make
the welfare-maximising decision? and
– Provide incentives to make the welfare-
maximising decision?
Asymmetric Cross-Examination
• Conference proceedings are adversarial:
cross-examination is in fact allowed.
– Commission experts and staff undertake
extensive cross-examination of parties.
– Normally do so without reference to the
constraints that would apply to cross-
examination in a court.
• This asymmetry in rights of cross-
examination serves to limit the influence of
stakeholders.
– Consistent with consultation rather than
examination.
Independent Experts
• Commission views independent experts as
speaking on behalf of parties.
– No consideration of the qualifications of
individuals to act as an expert.
– Views experts as having less weight than non-
expert testimony provided by third parties.
• Consistent with a process designed to
consult stakeholders rather than a process
designed to maximise scrutiny of the draft
determination.
A Consultation Process
• Commission’s approach to conferences is
consistent and logical when viewed as part of
a consultation process.
• But:
– Consultation processes do not promote rigorous
analysis of the Draft Determination, primarily
because the information flow is one-way and
neither the Commissioners nor the parties can
ask questions of the authors of the DD.
– Consultation is therefore not likely to provide the
optimal level of regulatory credibility or maximise
the chance of a welfare-enhancing decision.
Judicial and Legislative Review
• Legislation requires substantial interpretation
– Regulators have wide discretion
•  Legislative review will rarely be case-
specific, so legislative review is rare.
– Leaves regulators with wide discretion on
individual cases.
• Judicial review puts substantial limits on the
discretion available to the regulator in
individual cases (Spiller 1997).
Judicial and Legislative Review
• In New Zealand: “merit” and “law” for the
Commerce Act (except electricity and price
control provisions) but not for decisions
under industry specific regulation:
– Appeals under the Telecommunications Act and
under Electricity Industry price controls are
provided only on matters of law.
• In the US: merit and law for decisions of all
administrative and regulatory agencies
(Spiller 1997).
Judicial and Legislative Review
• Where the threat of judicial review is largely
absent, regulatory credibility requires that
much greater emphasis be placed on the
process, especially the quality of governance
and decision processes.
– Credibility will be enhanced where the structures
are clearly designed to make the Commissioners
independent adjudicators of the views of the
Commission staff and other parties.
• Judicial review improves credibility even
where the Commissioners are independent
– Tests the quality of the Commissioners’ analysis.
Summary of the Problems
• Governance and decision structures relating
to regulatory determinations are unclear.
• Conference procedures create a consultation
process:
– Asymmetric rights of cross-examination and
information flows provide scrutiny of submissions
but not of the work of the Commission.
• In the absence of judicial review, these
governance and decision problems reduce
the credibility of the regulatory process.
Solutions
• Solutions are straight forward:
– Right of appeal on merit and
– Symmetric rights of cross-examination
– Recognition of the independence of experts
– Separation of staff and commissioners
• Staff present and defend their report
• Commissioners write the decision themselves.
• Each of these solutions would provide
benefits but all would be present in the
optimal environment.
Costs and Benefits
• Some resource cost associated with most of
these proposals, but those costs are likely to
be small compared to
– recent increase in the Commission budget that
has been required to facilitate regulatory functions
– the cost of making decisions that are not optimal.
• Appeals are costly, so primary emphasis in
any reform should be given to improving the
integrity of the Commission’s governance
and decision processes.
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